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DECENTRALISATION IN AFRICA: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF UGANDA'S 
EXPERIENCE 
 
H Ojambo 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Uganda's experience with decentralisation is as highly acclaimed as it is criticised. 
Though regarded by some commentators as one of the most ambitious forms of 
devolution of power among the developing countries, it is also greatly criticised for its 
failure to deliver on its promises. According to Steiner, the scale and scope of the 
transfer of powers and responsibilities to the local level in Uganda's decentralisation 
reform is exceptional among developing countries.1 On their part, James and Francis 
have described it as "one of the most far-reaching local government reform 
programmes in the developing world."2 Mitchinson, in the same vein, contends that 
Uganda's decentralisation programme "is one of the most radical devolution 
initiatives of any country at this time."3 
 
But the quest for the fruits of decentralisation appears to be only increasing. As 
Tumushabe et al have lamentably observed:4 
 
Almost two decades later, the quality of public service delivery is less than 
desirable; district local governments with no financial resources of their own have 
become mere agents of the centre while the accountability mechanisms for good 
governance and public service delivery are either non-existent or malfunctional. 
 
Other commentators view Uganda's decentralisation programme as more of a 
political gimmick than a genuine effort to promote democracy and good governance:5 
                                                          
  Henry Ojambo. S.J.D. & LLM, University of Toronto. Lecturer, Makerere University; Partner, M/s 
Ojambo & Ojambo Advocates, Kampala, Uganda hojambo@law.mak.ac.ug. The author extends 
appreciation for research assistance to Ms. Barbra Nahone Ajambo. This paper immensely 
benefited from comments made at the conference organised by the Africa Law Association (ALA) 
in cooperation with the Max Plank Institute (MPI) on "Legal Transformation in North Africa and 
Decentralisation in Africa" at Heidelberg, Germany. 
1  Steiner Decentralisation in Uganda 1.  
2  Francis and James 2003 World Development 325 (also cited in Steiner Decentralisation in 
Uganda 1). 
3  Mitchinson 2003 Public Administration and Development 241 (also cited in Steiner 
Decentralisation in Uganda 1). 
4  Tumushabe et al Monitoring and Assessing the Performance vi. 
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…the creation of the districts did not follow any established parameters, neither was 
the process informed by administrative necessity or economic rationale. Instead the 
president announced their creation via presidential decrees, often to reward 
politicians threatening to withdraw support for the NRM, or punish those who had. 
 
The principal objectives of decentralisation have historically included the promotion 
of accountability, transparency, efficiency in governance and service delivery, and 
the empowerment of the masses from grass-root levels through the promotion of the 
participation of individuals and communities in their governance. Decentralisation is 
therefore generally viewed as an effective mechanism of extending and deepening 
the democratisation process to the grass-roots in order to promote people's-based 
development in the context of a high regard for human rights. 
 
Uganda's scenario presents a near-perfect fundamental contradiction between form 
and content. The great promise of improved accountability, efficiency in governance 
and the empowerment of the masses remains elusive in the country, notwithstanding 
the apparent commitment to the implementation of the decentralisation programme, 
at least at the formal level of the institutional and legal framework. According to a 
study6 commissioned by the World Bank, Uganda is ranked second to South Africa 
in almost all aspects of decentralisation in Africa. Ironically though, the same country 
is ranked among the most corrupt in the world with deplorable service delivery 
systems.7 This paper thus seeks to examine Uganda's experimentation with 
decentralisation with a view to unearthing the subterranean constraints that continue 
to inhibit the delivery of the great promises of the system. The paper traces the 
historical background to Uganda's decentralisation process, outlines the current 
structure of Uganda's decentralisation and closely examines the challenges to the 
realisation of the promises of decentralisation. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5  Oloka-Onyango Decentralisation Without Human Rights? 6. 
6  Ndegwa Decentralization in Africa. 
7  According to the 2011 corruption perception report produced by a global graft watchdog, 
Transparency International, Uganda is ranked number 143 of the 183 countries considered. For 
a more detailed analysis of the poor service delivery system in Uganda's decentralisation system, 
see Tumushabe et al Monitoring and Assessing the Performance vi and Oloka-Onyango 
Decentralisation Without Human Rights? 6. 
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2 The rationale and historical background of decentralisation in Uganda 
 
Defined as the devolution of powers in terms of public authority, resources, and 
personnel from the central government to sub-national levels, decentralisation can 
take different forms. In some cases, decentralisation may denote the transfer of such 
power from the central government to a province or state, as in the case of federal 
systems, or could refer to the transfer of such powers to lower levels of government 
within a unitary system. For the rather obvious reason that Uganda has a unitary 
system of government, this paper will focus on decentralisation in a unitary system 
and particularly where powers are devolved from the central government to the 
lower-level local government. In Uganda's case, the analysis focuses on the 
devolution of powers from the central government to the district and the lower-level 
local governments, which include the sub-county, municipality, division and parish. 
 
2.1 The historical background of decentralisation in Uganda  
 
The history of decentralisation in Uganda can be traced way back to the colonial 
days. However, it was not until the rise of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
government to power under the leadership of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni8 that 
decentralisation was accorded the prominence it enjoys in the country today. It will 
be recalled that the British, in the execution of their indirect rule policy, established a 
hybrid system of administration in most of their colonies including Uganda, where 
some powers were granted to the native leaders while the colonial government 
reserved overriding powers through the representatives of the colonial government. 
In Uganda's case, this system of administration was exemplified by the African 
Native Authority Ordinance of 1919,9 which provided for the powers and duties of 
African chiefs in the colonial administration. Under the Ordinance, chiefs were 
appointed at the village, sub-county and county levels with powers to collect taxes, 
preside over native courts, and maintain law and order. These chiefs were, however, 
                                                          
8  Museveni (the president of Uganda from 1986 to date) fought a guerilla war that brought him to 
power under a system of government known as the National Resistance Movement (NRM), 
commonly referred to as the Movement Government, which formed the first government under 
his leadership until 2001, when the country adopted a multiparty system of government. The 
name Movement was then adopted as the name of his political party, which continues to 
dominate Uganda's politics. 
9  Entebbe, Government Priner 1919. 
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accountable to the District Commissioner, the executive head of the district and the 
principal representative of the central government. 
 
The Local Government Ordinance of 194910 ushered in new changes by establishing 
the district as a local government unit with a fairly autonomous administration. 
Among the different organs of the district were the District Councils, which were 
comprised of elected members and were responsible for district administration. 
Notably, though, the central government still retained overriding powers over District 
Council decisions. Chiefs remained salaried local government officials who were 
responsible to the central government through the District Commissioner. 
 
During the colonial times other administrative units were kingdoms which more or 
less operated as federal states within the system. By the time of independence in 
1962 Uganda had 11 districts and four kingdoms. The independent Constitution of 
1962 established a decentralised system with elements of both federalism and 
decentralisation in the governance system. While the kingdom of Buganda was 
granted federal status, others such as Ankole, Bunyoro, Toro and the territory of 
Busoga were accorded semi-federal status. The rest of the country, comprised of the 
districts of Acholi, Bugisu, Bukedi, Karamoja, Kigezi, Lango, Madi, Sebei and West 
Nile, was administered through Councils.11 
 
The independence Constitution was abrogated in 1966. The successor Constitution 
of 1967 centralised powers. The overthrow of the post-independence Obote 
government by Idi Amin through a military coup led to the establishment of a military 
regime between 1971-1979 during which districts were dissolved and 
regional/provincial administrations led by Governors who were high-ranking military 
officers were established. The second Obote government (1980-1985) did not make 
any significant efforts to change the system.12 Thus Uganda gradually but steadily 
witnessed increased centralisation of powers through the various political regimes 
from independence until 1986, when the nascent NRM government initiated 
                                                          
10  The African Local Government Ordinance and District Council Proclamations and Regulations, 
1949; Entebbe, Government Printer, 1949. 
11  Tumushabe et al Monitoring and Assessing the Performance vi and Oloka-Onyango 
Decentralisation Without Human Rights? 6. 
12  Oloka-Onyango Decentralisation Without Human Rights? 4-9. 
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fundamental changes in local government which culminated in the enactment of the 
Local Government Statute of 1993 and the subsequent Local Government Act of 
1997. Under the same regime, the 1995 Constitution, which adopted and further 
articulated the local government system of government, was promulgated. The 
current system of local government is by far more robust and elaborate than any 
other that was ever attempted in the country's history. 
 
2.2 Rationale   
 
The reasons for the adoption of the current system of decentralisation under 
Museveni were largely internal. Unlike the previous efforts, many of which took the 
form of the deconcentration13 of powers from the centre to lower levels of 
government through representatives of the central government, the current system of 
local government grants by far the widest and most robust devolution of powers.14 
The adoption of such an ambitious system of local government is partly, and indeed 
largely, explained by Uganda's post-independence turbulent political history and the 
peculiar challenges that affected the NRM government in its early days. 
 
Prior to the rise of the NRM government in 1986, Uganda's history had been 
characterised by recurrent political turbulence. Beginning with the overthrow of the 
first Obote regime by Idi Amin Dada through a military coup in 1971 and the 
subsequent military overthrow of Idi Amini's regime in 1979, through the successive 
short-lived governments that were established and overthrown in a matter of months 
between the end of Amin's government in 1979 and the second Obote government in 
1981, Uganda largely experienced military leadership. Expectations of the 
restoration of democratic governance after the election of the second Obote 
government into power in 1980 were thwarted by the 1985 coup championed by Tito 
Okello Lutwa. The Tito Okello government lasted only a few months before it too was 
overthrown by the NRM rebel forces under the leadership of Museveni in 1986. 
 
                                                          
13  Deconcentration "involves the transfer of some powers and responsibilities to lower 
administrative units operated by officials appointed by the central authority, who implement 
defined functions under tight control." See Oloka-Onyango Decentralisation Without Human 
Rights? 6-7. 
14  The structure of the current system of local government is discussed later in the paper. 
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Throughout this post-independence period of political turmoil, Uganda experienced 
various socio-economic challenges ranging from endemic gross violations of human 
rights through economic plunder and decadence to outright lack of democratic 
governance. Upon its rise to power through an armed rebellion partly prompted by 
the then socio-economically decadent situation, the NRM government quite 
understandably made democratisation one of its major goals. This was vividly 
captured in one of Museveni's inaugural speeches when he asserted:15 
 
The first point in our programme is the restoration of democracy. The people of 
Africa – the people of Uganda – are entitled to a democratic government. It is not a 
favour from any government. It is the right of the people of Africa to have 
democratic government; the sovereign power in the land must be the population, 
not the government. In our liberated zones, the first thing we started was the 
election of Village Resistance Committees. My mother, for instance cannot go to 
parliament but she can surely become a member of a Committee so that she too, 
can make her views heard. We have, therefore set up village, muluka (parish), 
gombolola (sub-county) and district committees … but right now I want to 
emphasize that our first point in our political programme is democracy for the 
people of Uganda. 
   
But it should be noted that the creation of local councils (committees) was not 
originally informed by the desire to create democratic institutions. As Steiner 
observes, "the local councils were originally established for political reasons and not 
with the aim of improving service delivery or reducing poverty."16 In fact, according to 
Mugabi, the explanation lay in considerations of political expediency. The long 
protracted war that brought the NRM government to power greatly weakened state 
organs in the entire country. In areas where war was directly waged government 
systems were literally non-existent, as the rebel forces had in some cases taken 
control of parts of such areas. This created an administrative vacuum especially in 
local governance, which the rebel forces addressed by appointing members of the 
local communities in the areas they controlled to fill the gaps in local administration. 
Resistance Councils comprised of members were accordingly created with both 
administrative and security mandates in their areas of jurisdiction. Thus:17 
 
During the "bush war" of the early 1980s, the organs of the state were destroyed, 
thus creating a vacuum in local governance. The NRM had no spare manpower to 
                                                          
15  Mugabi 2004 unpan1.un.org 1-2. 
16  Steiner Decentralisation in Uganda 9. 
17  Mugabi 2004 unpan1.un.org 1-2. 
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utilize as local administrators. Accordingly, local communities were requested to 
elect from amongst themselves, councils to perform the duties of the defunct agents 
and organs of the old state. However, the primary role of these councils was to 
resist infiltration - through a network of information gathering on the operations of 
the enemy and liaising with the NRM intelligence organs – hence the name 
"resistance councils".  
 
Once in power, the NRM government embarked on steps aimed at improving and 
legally entrenching the resistance council system of administration for the reasons 
already stated – democratic governance, filling the gaps in administration created by 
the destruction of state organs during the war, and the promotion of security. Indeed, 
shortly after taking over power the Museveni government established a commission 
of inquiry into local government under the leadership of Mahmood Mamdani. A white 
paper was prepared and presented to government and henceforth the government 
vigorously embarked on decentralisation based on the resistance council system. By 
1987 the government had enacted the Resistance Council's and Committees Statute 
(the RC Statute), which repealed part 1 of the Local Administration Act of 1967 and 
the Urban Authorities Act of 1964. The RC Statute marked the very beginning of the 
formal decentralisation process under the Movement government by transferring 
such powers as planning, decision making and the administration of justice to the 
community-based Resistance Council system. 
 
Thus, the adoption of the system of democratisation through the devolution of 
powers can fairly largely be attributed to local factors. Nonetheless, the role of 
external factors cannot be underestimated. Undoubtedly, Uganda is part of the Third 
World that has been subjected to some pressure from the donor community to 
embrace decentralisation as a pathway to democratic governance. Quite compelling 
assumptions have always been made about the great potential of decentralisation in 
deepening democracy and these have rendered it a near-universal prescription for 
addressing the governance challenges faced in the developing world.    
 
2.3 Objectives of decentralisation 
 
If well implemented, decentralisation promises efficient and accountable governance 
through the increased involvement of the people in the way they are governed. That 
is, decentralisation promotes people's participation in important government 
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functions such as decision making, the identification of problems, priority setting, 
planning and monitoring the implementation of any programmes, which in effect 
promotes and ensures the better allocation and utilisation of resources. It is also 
generally believed that when people are involved in their own governance through 
decentralisation, accountability on the part of office bearers is enhanced, hence 
leading to more efficient utilisation of public resources, which in turn promotes 
development. Decentralisation also promises greater respect for human rights 
through the involvement of people in the design, planning and implementation of 
government programmes/policies. Over all, decentralisation enhances the process of 
governance. 
 
However, the extent to which any decentralised system will deliver these noble 
objectives depends on more than the mere adoption of the system. While the formal 
legal framework/structure of any given decentralised system is important in the 
determination of its success, other extraneous factors such as the level of people's 
awareness, the availability of the necessary resources and the commitment of the 
central government are usually critical in determining the degree of success. 
Uganda's experience with decentralisation is particularly intriguing given the manifest 
contradictions between the rather admirable formal legal framework, on the one 
hand, and the continued deplorable plunder of public resources, impunity, poor 
service delivery and the continued high rate of violation of human rights, on the 
other. Before a critical discussion of the challenges faced in the decentralisation 
process in Uganda is undertaken, the country's highly acclaimed decentralised 
structure deserves to be briefly discussed.    
 
3 The structure and functions of local government in Uganda  
 
Local government in Uganda is based on the district as the basic unit. Various local 
governments and administrative units resort within the district. The district council, 
which is comprised of elected members, is the highest political authority having 
legislative and executive powers within the district, and other councils in lower-level 
local government are also the highest political authorities in their jurisdictions.18 
                                                          
18  Section 3 Local Government Act of 1997 (LGA). 
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The structure of local government in Uganda takes different forms depending on 
whether the administrative area in question is rural or urban. Other than Kampala 
City, which has a special local government administrative structure19, the local 
government system is comprised of a five-tier structure where, in rural areas, the 
village council (LC1) forms the lowest level, followed by the parish council (LC2), 
then the sub-county council (LC3), the county council (LC4), and at the top (the 
district) the district council (LC5).20 On the other hand, in urban districts the structure 
begins with the village council (LC1), then the ward or parish council (LC2), the 
municipal or town division (LC3), the municipality (LC4) and the district council 
(LC5/mayor).21  
   
The district council is the basic local government unit while the municipal council, city 
division council, the municipal division council, and the town council are lower-level 
local governments. Both the district council and the lower-level local government 
units have corporate status with perpetual succession and a common seal, and they 
have independent legal personality in the sense that they can sue and be sued in 
their corporate name. On the other hand, the county council, the parish/ward council 
and the village council are merely administrative unit councils without corporate 
status and thus enjoy less autonomy in the local government system than the local 
government units. The functions of these administrative units are limited to dispute 
resolution, monitoring of the delivery of services, and assisting in the maintenance of 
law, order and security. 
In their areas of jurisdiction, local government councils are mandated to perform a 
variety of state functions ranging from making development plans based on locally 
determined priorities, raising revenue, budgeting (on condition that all of their 
budgets are balanced), and appointing statutory commissions, boards and 
committees for personnel (District Service Commission), land (District Land Boards), 
procurement (District and Urban Tender Boards) and accountability (Local 
                                                          
19  Kampala, as the capital city, is governed under a special legislation, Kampala Capital City 
Authority Act of 2010 (KCCA). Though the City Council is the highest authority under KCCA, the 
executive functions are discharged by the Chief Executive Officer, who is appointed by the 
central government, while the Lord Mayor is the chief political officer and is elected, just like his 
counterparts in other districts, the LC5. 
20  Section 3(2) LGA. 
21  Section 3(4) LGA. 
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Government Public Account Committees), to establish or abolish offices in the public 
service of the district, as well as to hire and manage personnel in addition to 
managing their own payroll and pension. Local governments are also vested with 
powers to provide such services as education (except tertiary education), health 
services (except referral hospitals), the construction of roads (except those under the 
central government), and ambulance services. 
 
While the central government retains jurisdiction with respect to such areas as 
security – defence, law and order, mines, minerals, water resources, banks, 
citizenship, national parks, foreign relations, national elections and national plans - it 
also oversees the performance of local governments through the office of the 
Resident District Commissioner (RDC). Under section 71 of the Local Government 
Act, the RDC is mandated to represent the President and the Government in the 
district, coordinate the administration of government services in the district, advise 
the district chairperson on matters of national interest, monitor and inspect the 
activities of local government, sensitise the populace on government policies, draw 
the attention of the Auditor General to the need for special investigations where 
necessary, and advise the district chairperson to instruct the district internal auditor 
to carry out a special audit and submit the report to council. The RDC is also 
mandated to draw the attention of the Inspector General of government to a need to 
investigate any cases of mismanagement or the abuse of office, just as he could 
draw the attention of any relevant line ministry to the divergence from or 
noncompliance with the Government policy by any council in his jurisdiction. 
 
The Local Government Act also provides for the office of the Chief Administrative 
Officer (CAO), who is appointed by the public service commission and serves as the 
head of the public service in the district, the head of the administration of the district 
council and also as the accounting officer of the district. The CAO is thus responsible 
for the implementation of all lawful decisions by the council; giving guidance to the 
local government councils and their departments; and supervising, monitoring and 
coordinating the activities of the district and lower council employees; and he acts as 
the liaison officer between the district and the Government. Both the office of the 
RDC and the CAO are represented at all lower levels of government. 
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Financially, local governments are entitled to levy, charge and collect local taxes and 
fees as locally generated revenue. But they also receive grants of different kinds 
from the central government to supplement their meager revenue collections not only 
for local programmes but also for the purpose of enabling them to implement 
government plans at the local level. The different grants given to local government 
include conditional22, unconditional23 and equalisation grants.24 
 
All in all, therefore, Uganda's framework of local government entails three different 
forms of devolution of power, namely: 1) political decentralisation (as evidenced by 
the election of council members), 2) administrative decentralisation (as evidenced by 
the appointment of local administration personnel by council), and 3) fiscal 
decentralisation (as evidenced by the powers granted to local councils to raise local 
revenue and receive funds from the central government for the implementation of 
agreed-upon national programmes).    
 
4 The performance of the decentralised system in Uganda 
 
It is now over two decades since Uganda adopted decentralisation, a system of 
government considered as a pathway to improving governance in terms of 
democratisation and service delivery. Yet, as earlier noted, Uganda's level of 
accountability for public resources and service delivery remains deplorable. This 
rather ironic situation naturally raises questions about the performance of 
decentralisation in the country. According to Ndegwa's stocktaking analysis of 
Uganda's performance in the different aspects of decentralisation, the country 
appears to be in the best category on the continent. On political decentralisation, the 
main indicators of which include the number of elected sub-national tiers, the 
                                                          
22  Article 193(3) Uganda Constitution of 1995 defines conditional grants as consisting of monies 
given to local governments to finance programmes agreed upon between the government and 
the local governments, which monies are expended only for the purposes for which the grant was 
made and in accordance with the conditions agreed upon.   
23  Article 193(2) Uganda Constitution of 1995 defines the unconditional grant as the minimum grant 
that shall be paid to local government to run decentralised services.   
24  Article 193(4) Uganda Constitution of 1995 defines the equalisation grant as the money to be 
paid to local government for giving subsidies or making special provisions for the least developed 
districts, and provides that it shall be based on the degree to which the local government unit is 
lagging behind the national average standard for a particular service.  
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existence of direct elections for local governments, and the turn-out and fairness of 
such elections, Uganda scores above 3 on a scale of 4.25 
 
Quite similarly, the country also scored quite an impressive 3 on a scale of 4 in terms 
of its administrative decentralisation, the indicators of which include the role of local 
administrative staff in the formulation of the development agenda and the delivery of 
services, the existence of a clear legal framework demarcating the roles of local and 
central government, and the institutionalisation of the principle of subsidiarity, where 
actual service delivery is delegated to and performed by localities and civil servants 
responsible to local authorities.26 Uganda also performed quite well in terms of its 
fiscal decentralisation, which was assessed on the basis of the amount of the fiscal 
transfers made from the central government to the localities as well as the proportion 
of public expenditure controlled by the localities. Uganda emerge the third out of the 
30 countries analysed in the study with a 3.5 on a scale of 5 in this category. 
 
If these findings are indeed anything to go by, how then does one account for the 
rather obvious state of decay of local administration, the poor service delivery, and 
wholesale plunder of public resources that continues to dog the country? It is indeed 
ironic, and quite baffling, that a country that seems to have even exceeded its 
expectations in the decentralisation process should also be among the worst 
performing in terms of accountability and service delivery in its governance system. 
 
While it is certainly difficult to make a claim to having a perfect explanation for the 
current rather contradictory situation obtaining in the country, a look into the 
historical background to the adoption of decentralisation could possibly offer some 
insight. As earlier noted, and quite unlike the experience in other countries where the 
adoption of decentralisation has been externally driven27, Uganda's adoption of a 
system of devolution of power was partly and largely necessitated by considerations 
of political expediency. The days when security was a major concern for the NRM 
regime are long gone. Concerns about resources, be they fiscal or human, may still 
                                                          
25  Ndegwa Decentralization in Africa 3. 
26  Ndegwa Decentralization in Africa 4. 
27  Steiner acknowledges this fact when she notes: "… Uganda is different from many other 
countries where decentralisation was motivated by a fiscal crisis of the central government or by 
external conditionality." (Steiner Decentralisation in Uganda 9). 
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apply but they no longer pose a threat to the government. The effect of this has been 
the reversal of the commitment to the system of local government by the central 
government, which now appears to espouse a desire to run the government more 
from the centre than through local governments, many of which are now proving 
problematic in the new multiparty political dispensation. 
 
The introduction of multiparty politics in Uganda in the early 2000s engendered a 
new threat to the NRM government. Unlike the prior "enemy," who could be 
effectively checked through the Resistance council system, the multiparty system 
created a different type of "enemy" that could no longer be effectively 
combated/checked through a system of local council networks. With time, the new 
"enemy" in the form of the opposition has spread out and taken root in most of the 
districts, a fact that has shaken the trust once enjoyed between districts (when their 
councils were predominantly NRMS supporters) and the NRM government at the 
centre. In fact the discomfort between the NRM government and the local 
government system started to manifest itself in the early 1990s when opposition 
groups started to agitate for the restoration of multiparty politics. As Oloka-Onyango 
aptly notes:28  
 
The claim that RCs were a system of "popular" selection based on the "individual 
merit" of the candidates who stood for office was severely undermined by the fact 
that the state (which was controlled by the NRM) intervened heavily in support of 
some candidates, while it actively decampaigned, intimidated and blackmailed 
others. The peak of hypocrisy was reached when President Museveni declared "We 
have won!" following the 1993 elections for the Constituent Assembly which were 
originally supposed to be run on an "no party" basis. Who was the "we" in such a 
situation? 
 
With the restoration of multiparty politics and the steadily waning popularity of the 
NRM government amidst the rising popularity of the opposition, whose members 
dominate local councils in some districts, the NRM now finds itself at war for its own 
survival with the very system it created to bolster its political hegemony. With council 
members from different political parties comprising the local government councils at 
all levels, the NRM government finds itself in an unusual position where it can no 
longer effectively ensure control over local politics. In effect, the councils no longer 
                                                          
28  Oloka-Onyango Decentralisation Without Human Rights? 10-11. 
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enjoy the trust they once wielded from government, and as a result it is hardly 
surprising that the forces of recentralisation have intensified over time. As the central 
government strives to ensure stricter control over the affairs of local governments, 
especially through fiscal and political interference, the concept of decentralisation is 
steadily losing meaning and giving way to the reconcentration of power in the central 
government. 
 
Closely related to the loss of trust is the politicisation of the decentralisation process, 
which is another factor that could explain Uganda's rather paradoxical situation. The 
original purpose for the creation of resistance (local) councils having been rendered 
obsolete, the NRM government has skillfully but successfully been able to use the 
decentralised system for quite another purpose which has only served to weaken 
local governance further. Under the Constitution, new districts could be created on 
the basis of the necessity for effective administration and the need to bring services 
closer to people. Other considerations that ought to be taken into account in the 
creation of new districts include the means of communication, geographical features, 
the density of the population, economic viability, and the wishes of the people 
concerned. Evidently, all of the grounds required for the creation of new districts lack 
specificity and can quite easily be exploited, as indeed has been the case. The NRM 
government has tended to use the creation of districts both as a reward for its 
supporters and as a condition for support in areas where it has historically not 
enjoyed popular support. This politicisation of the decentralisation process has 
greatly undermined its performance. From only 38 districts in 1986 when NRM rose 
to power, Uganda now boasts over 100 districts. As Oloka-Onyango rightly 
observes:29 
 
… the strategy of district proliferation has … been adopted by President Museveni 
as a means of dispensing patronage, and ultimately of splintering challenges to 
central government hegemony and control. 
 
By using the creation of districts as a reward for political support, the government 
has been steadily increasing its expenditure portfolio without necessarily balancing it 
with increased GDP, which has naturally affected the local governments' ability to 
                                                          
29  Oloka-Onyango (n 28 above) 6. 
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improve on service delivery due to their limited funding. The local government 
system envisages a financial partnership with the central government in the sense 
that while the central government remains duty bound to fund national programmes 
through the local government, the local government too was expected to raise local 
revenue for the purpose of funding its budget. With limited funding and no reliable 
source of local revenue, the local governments have been reduced to mere agents of 
the centre. It is important to note that the government has been notorious in 
undermining the fiscal autonomy of local governments. For instance, originally the 
major source of revenue for local governments was graduated tax, which, for clearly 
political reasons, was abolished just before the 2006 elections. This created 
increased dependence of local governments on the central government, with the 
obvious effect of undermining the local governments' capacity to plan and perform 
effectively. As Steiner observes:30 
 
… the principal problem with regard to local finance is that collection of local taxes 
and fees is extremely low… Reasons for this are manifold and include the 
politicisation of local taxes … 
 
She adds:31 
 
… the problem of low tax collection is far from being resolved. Instead of improving 
local governments' capacity to collect taxes and fees, the central government 
recently abolished graduated personal tax … 
 
The lack of awareness of the masses and the incompetence of the local 
administrative staff and local politicians are yet other factors that have continued to 
undermine the performance of the local government system in Uganda. The claim 
that decentralisation promotes people's participation in the way they are governed is 
premised on the assumption that people understand their roles in the decentralised 
programme. One of the challenges evident in Uganda's decentralised programme is, 
however, that the government appears to operate under the illusion that people know 
their roles in the decentralised system, an assumption which is absurdly wrong, 
especially in a country where the illiteracy level is still quite high. Under the said 
illusion, districts have been created all over the country without conducting civic 
                                                          
30  Steiner Decentralisation in Uganda 12. 
31  Steiner Decentralisation in Uganda 12. 
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education to empower the masses for the purpose of meaningfully getting involved in 
local administration. The effect of this rather sporadic, radical approach to 
decentralisation, which entails a total shift in the manner in which governance is 
conducted,32 has led to a clear lack of consistency and compliance with the 
requirements under the decentralisation legal framework. As Steiner observes, 
"people have not fully understood what decentralisation is about and what their rights 
and duties are."33 The lack of awareness among the masses has rendered the notion 
of decentralisation more of a myth than a reality since the envisaged people's 
participation in their governance remains too sketchy and almost meaningless. This 
is moreover compounded by the general lack of competent staff in local government: 
"both politicians and civil servants are often inadequately trained…"34 
 
Perhaps the most revealing effect of the lack of awareness of the masses and the 
incompetence of local government staff is found in the planning process. Under the 
local government legal framework,35 
 
… the planning cycle provides for a consecutive elaboration of plans starting at the 
lowest level so that the plan of each level can be integrated into the plan of the next 
higher level. 
 
 But this is rarely complied with. In a study conducted in Tororo district, it was found 
in the three sub-counties that were visited that none had submitted "their plan to the 
district even though the new fiscal year had already started."36 The ignorance and 
incompetence of the people and the local government staff are some of the reasons 
for the failure of compliance with the principles and procedures of decentralised 
governance:37 
 
                                                          
32  Decentralisation entails a drastic shift in the nature of governance in the sense that it marks a 
shift from the government's deciding what is best for the people to the people's telling 
government what is best for them. See Steiner Decentralisation in Uganda 16. 
33  Steiner Decentralisation in Uganda 16. 
34  Steiner Decentralisation in Uganda 13. 
35  Steiner Decentralisation in Uganda 15. 
36  Steiner Decentralisation in Uganda 15. 
37  Steiner Decentralisation in Uganda 15. Other reasons for the poor compliance with local 
government procedures include mistrust of the capacity of lower-level local government levels 
and hence disrespect for their identified priorities; delays in the submission of their plans, and 
logistical constraints. 
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Ignorance of procedures among the officials in charge can represent the source of 
the problem… Many officials simply do not understand the rules of the game, and 
nobody at the local level is informed about what is going on, who has which plans, 
and whether plans have been written at all. 
   
Government inefficiency has combined with the old problem of corruption to 
exacerbate matters. I have been told by many people who work in local government 
that government usually delays sending grants to local governments. By the time the 
money is received, the time for some of the planned activities would have passed. In 
such situations, the local governments have to choose between fabricating records 
to justify the expenditure of the money or sending the unutilised funds back to central 
government. While the latter would seem the right option to take, the reality is 
different: sending money back to the central government is usually construed as a 
failure on the part of the affected local government and could easily adversely affect 
future funding. The effect of this government inefficiency has not only been the 
undermining of service delivery by local governments but also the promotion of 
corruption. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The ironic outcome of Uganda's policy of decentralisation speaks to the challenges 
faced generally in the developing world. Decentralisation as a concept is not just 
about form, in the sense of developing a good legal and institutional framework, as 
has taken place in Uganda; it is also about content and process. The contradictions 
that characterise the Ugandan system of decentralisation are explained by factors 
that require effective mechanisms to address them. The challenges that continue to 
inhibit the performance of Uganda's decentralised system of governance are peculiar 
to Uganda's political history and facing up to them will certainly require a change of 
heart among the government leadership at the very least, or a change of regime. A 
true commitment to democratic values, where the leadership believes in the genuine 
empowerment of the masses, is critical to the effective performance of Uganda's 
decentralised system. 
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